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The impact of leverage on post-merger performance has been a subject of relative low debate 
within the literature on Mergers & Acquisitions. Some authors have studied the impact of 
several variables in post-merger performance, such as methods of payment, prior M&A 
experience, and whether an acquisition was performed by a conglomerate. Nevertheless, there 
is a dearth of literature for exploring the impact of leverage on a firm’s post-merger 
performance. Thus, through the use of an innovative model, this dissertation studies the impact 
of the capital structure of the acquiring and targeted firm on the years following the merger. 
Based on a sample of 594 mergers between 1990 and 2013, we found that, on average, a highly 
leveraged firm acquiring either a highly leveraged company or a lowly leveraged firm was 
negatively and significantly associated with post-merger performance. We subjected our results 
to further testing through a specific analysis of recession and expansion years, against different 
risk categories of sample cases. Our results for these only further solidified the conclusions 
derived from our general sample analysis. This work has led to the conclusion that when 
acquiring firms are highly levered, the firm’s post-merger performance is weaker than 
otherwise. 
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Impacto de Alavancagem no Desempenho de Fusões & Aquisições: Evidência de 
Empresas Públicas dos Estados Unidos da América 
 





O impacto da alavancagem no desempenho pós-fusão tem sido alvo de debate relativamente 
baixo na literatura sobre Fusões e Aquisições.  Alguns autores estudaram o impacto de várias 
variáveis no desempenho pós-fusão, como métodos de pagamento, experiência anterior em 
Fusões e Aquisições e se uma aquisição foi realizada por um conglomerado. No entanto, existe 
escassez de literatura que explora o impacto da alavancagem no desempenho pós-fusão de uma 
empresa. Assim, através do uso de um modelo inovador, esta tese estuda o impacto da estrutura 
de capital da empresa adquirente nos anos subsequentes à fusão. Com base numa amostra de 
594 fusões entre 1990 e 2013, descobrimos que, em média, uma empresa altamente alavancada 
que adquire uma empresa altamente alavancada ou uma empresa pouco alavancada está 
negativa e significativamente associada com o desempenho pós-fusão.  Aplicámos a análise 
para anos de recessão e expansão e para diferentes categorias de risco. Os nossos resultados 
para estes apenas solidificaram ainda mais as conclusões derivadas da nossa análise geral da 
amostra. Esta tese levou à conclusão de que, empresas adquirentes altamente alavancadas, o 
desempenho pós-fusão da empresa é mais fraco do que o contrário. 
 
Palavras-chave: fusões, aquisições, alavancagem, desempenho 
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1. Introduction  
Scholars have studied the impact of several variables on firms’ post-merger performances. Most 
of the literature, embodying the classical approach for assessing the post-merger performance 
of a firm, focuses on analysing abnormal returns around announcement dates. (Franks et al., 
1991) However, a select few have studied merger performance from a long-term perspective. 
Historically, the literature has focused on variables such as methods of payment (DeAngelo et 
al., 1984; Travlos, 1987; Heron and Lie, 2002), prior M&A experience (Lahey and Conn, 1990; 
Bruton et al., 1994; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999) and whether an acquisition was performed 
by a conglomerate firm or not (Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Lewellen, 1971; Stein, 1997). The study 
of the capital structure of acquiring and target firms has been an overlooked variable in this 
context. Even though Smith (1990) studied the impact of leverage in securities prices and Heron 
and Lie (2002) analyse the impact of leverage on methods of payment, both sets of authors have 
fallen short of exploring the impact of leverage from both the acquiring and targeted firm on 
post-merger performance. Thus, our main objective in this dissertation is to focus on how firms’ 
capital structure might impact such post-merger performances.  
Our innovative model studies the relationship between the capital structure of the companies 
involved in these transactions and the post-merger performance of the acquiring firm. For this 
purpose, we have divided our analysis into three main timeframes so as to capture any potential 
time-variant effects. Firstly, we consider the performance of both firms during the five years 
before and after the merger. Secondly, we perform the same analysis on the three years before 
and following the merger. Finally, we repeat these analyses solely on the one year before and 
the one year following the merger.   
To assess the performance of the company, a particularly relevant measure suggested by Healy 
et al. (1992) is used. His work provides for the creation of a variable by dividing a firm’s pre-
tax operating cash flow by the market value of its assets. The relevance of this measure is related 
with its proficiency in comparing performance across firms in a standardized manner. Since 
pre-tax operating cash flow over the market value of assets, an unlevered measure, excludes the 
effect of interests and taxes, the effect of the method of payment in earnings, which is a levered 
accounting variable, can be excluded. In the specific cases where the merger is financed by 
debt, earnings would be impacted, creating a strong bias in the results. Our proposed model 
studies the impact of four scenarios in post-merger performance: a highly levered company 
acquiring a highly levered company, a lowly levered company acquiring a lowly levered 
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company, a highly levered company acquiring a lowly levered company, and a lowly levered 
company acquiring a highly levered company. 
We find that a highly leveraged firm acquiring either a highly leveraged firm or a lowly 
leveraged firm was associated with a negative and significant impact on post-merger 
performance. Our findings and analyses are based on a sample of 594 mergers between 1990 
and 2013. These results are verified when considering both a three- and one-year timeframe of 
analysis pre- and post-merger. When analysing along a five-year period before and after the 
transaction instead, we were unable to find significant results. This might be explained by the 
dilution of the leverage effect over a longer period of time.   
We then performed this same statistical model specifically on economic expansion and 
recession years within the sample. When economic recession years were considered, no 
relationship between leverage and post-merger performance was discovered. In the case of 
economic expansion years however, we found that, on average, a highly leveraged firm 
acquiring a lowly leveraged firm was associated with a negative impact on post-merger 
performance.  
Moreover, the same methodology was studied for different risk categories. For that, we proxied 
company risk profile as the measure suggested by Edward Altman (1968) – Altman Z-Score. 
We could not find significant results when the Altman Z-Score of the acquirer is higher than 
the median of our sample.  On the other hand, when the Altman Z-Score was lower than the 
median of the sample, we found that on average, a highly leveraged company acquiring other 
highly leveraged firms was associated with a negative impact on performance. The latter of 
these results occurs for a three-year analysis of pre- and post-merger performance. Finally, 
when a one-year margin for performance is analysed, we found that a when a highly leveraged 
firm acquires a lowly leveraged company there is also an overall decrease in the firm’s 
performance.   
According to authors such as Loughran & Vijh (1997), and Oler (2008), the analysis of past 
mergers and acquisitions activity has proven that post-merger performance is typically 
negative. On the other hand, however, high leverage used for acquisition purposes is usually 
expected to generate an increase in performance since it can reduce agency costs, creating 
additional pressure on managers to allocate resources to productive projects (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Jensen (1986) further finds that leverage creates friction on managers to spend 
more energy and time for the purpose of assuring the merger’s success. When considering the 
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trade-off theory suggested by Modigliani and Miller (1963), there are costs and benefits to 
increasing debt. Debt might increase the risk of bankruptcy and debt servicing costs but added 
leverage might reduce agency costs while increase tax shields.  
The ultimate goal of our analysis is to assess whether managers should take the capital structure 
of their firms and companies into consideration in determining whether they are willing to 
acquire, before any M&A activity has taken place.  
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review 
on the impact of several variables in mergers and acquisitions’ performance, along with the 
most relevant literature on the influence of capital structures on firms’ decision-making 
processes regarding M&A. Section 3 describes the methodology used and explains our variable 
construction and selection. Section 4 describes the sources for our data and presents summary 
statistics, while Section 5 analyses our subsequent results. Our work is thus concluded in 



















2. Literature Review  
Post-merger performance is by no means an unusual topic within the mergers and acquisitions’ 
field of research. The classical approach for assessing performance after a merger is to evaluate 
the firm’s stock in order to detect any abnormal gains or losses (Franks et al., 1991). Several 
studies in the literature focus on the impact of abnormal returns around the day of the merger’s 
announcement. However, few studies analyse the long-term performance of such deals. Only a 
handful of approaches have been put forward to assess post-merger performance (Dimson and 
Marsh, 1986; Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990; Franks et al., 1991; Healy et al., 1992; Agrawal 
et al., 1992). These studies will be the subject of this chapter, and their utility towards this 
paper’s objective will be made clear.  
Healy et al. (1992) study post-merger performances using a sample data of the 50 largest 
mergers in the US between 1979 and 1983. He conceptualizes cash flow over the market value 
of assets as a performance measure and compares the five years before the merger, by adding 
accounting fundamentals of the merged firms in those years, with the subsequent five post-
merger years. The authors find that performance decreases after the merger, except when he 
compares their performance with the overall industry, whereby he concludes that there is an 
increase in relative asset productivity. They also find that there is a consistent relationship 
between post-merger performance and abnormal stock returns after merger announcements, 
which they justify with post-merger cash flow increases. On the other hand, Agrawal et al. 
(1992) chose to focus on the variance in shareholders' wealth over the five post-merger years. 
In their seminal 1992 paper, they use a sample data of mergers between NYSE acquirers and 
NYSE/AMEX targets from 1955 to 1987. Adopting the abnormal return methodology proposed 
by Dimson and Marsh (1986) and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990), they find that 
shareholders of the acquiring firm suffer a statistically significant loss of about 10% during the 
five years after such deals. Their findings challenge the results of Franks et al. (1991), who 
concluded that the variance in returns after the merger was not significantly negative. Agrawal 
et al. (1992) justify the difference in the results they obtained as time-dependent effects of the 
dataset Franks et al. (1991) relied upon.  
A growing body of literature has examined the impact of several variables in post-merger 
performance. Most of the research focuses on variables such as (i) the method of payment (cash 
vs stock), (ii) prior M&A experience, and (iii) whether an acquisition was performed by a 
conglomerate firm or not. 
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The method of payment impact on post-merger performance has been a subject of constant 
debate over the years. There is a signalling effect on the method of payment in mergers and 
acquisitions. Managers of the bidder firm prefer cash offers when they believe that the target 
firm is undervalued, while stock offers are preferred when they wish to share acquisition risks 
with the seller (DeAngelo et al., 1984). Consequently, the market reacts positively to cash offers 
and negatively to stock offers, thereby affecting stock returns. Travlos (1987), using an event-
study method, found that acquirer stockholders suffer significant losses in pure stock offers but 
experience normal returns in cash offers. They used a data set of mergers between 1972 and 
1981 retrieved from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). These results are 
consistent with the signalling of the payment method that challenges the conclusions of Healy 
et al. (1992), as the latter do not find a relation between the method of payment and abnormal 
stock returns observed post-merger. A difference in the data samples might explain this 
disparity – Healy et al. (1992) only use the 50 largest mergers in their sample period, perhaps 
too low a number to yield significant results. Travlos (1987), on the other hand, use 167 
acquiring firms (sixty are relative to stock offer, one hundred are cash offers, and seven are 
combinations of stock and cash). Healy et al. (1992) further do not specify the type of offers in 
his dataset. Heron and Lie (2002) seemingly confirm Travlos (1987)’s finding that merged firms 
experience negative abnormal returns after merger announcements through a stock offer, while 
cash offers are usually accompanied by normal returns. Nevertheless, they further find that post-
merger returns are both positive for the two types of method of payment, being significantly 
higher for cash offers. Thus, they conclude that “both the bidder’s returns and the combined 
firm’s returns suggest that announcement of cash acquisitions convey more favourable 
information than do announcements of stock returns” (Heron and Lie, 2002: 139). 
Some authors have studied the impact of previous M&A experience in post-merger 
performances. On the one hand, some authors propose that prior acquisition experience has no 
relation to the performance of an acquisition (Lahey and Conn, 1990). On the other hand, 
various researchers conclude that previous M&A experience has high explanatory power in 
regard to post-merger performance. Using a dataset of 449 acquisitions that occurred between 
1980 and 1992, Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) conclude that when an acquisition is dissimilar 
to previous acquisitions, the acquisition experience led to a negative impact on performance. 
Yet, when the current acquisition is similar to the previous acquisition, there is a positive 
influence on the performance. Bruton et al. (1994) and Haleblian et al. (2006) share this notion, 
but while the former test the impact of previous M&A experience in acquisitions of financially 
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distressed firms, the latter test it on the U.S’s commercial banking industry. Both sets of authors 
conclude that managers tend to adapt their behaviours according to previous experience, leading 
to a positive impact in post-merger performances.  
There is also a lack of consensus in the literature on whether an acquisition made by a 
conglomerate firm has an impact on the combined firm’s performance. Some authors 
investigate the benefits of a conglomerate merger by evaluating the market side of the operation 
(Hadlock et al., 1999). Such investigations conclude that investors are reticent regarding 
conglomerates since they believe that such firms are very complex, creating difficulties in 
performing accurate valuations. Other researchers focus on the cash flow side: 
1. evaluating correlations and significance of different income streams within conglomerate 
firms (Levy, 1970); 
2. studying upsides in the ability to afford higher debt capacity to increase tax shields 
(Lewellen, 1971); 
3. analyzing efficiency increases in investment activities by boosting internal capital markets 
(Stein, 1997).  
Overall, there is a vast literature that assesses the impact of this variable in the post-merger 
performance. While some authors focus on positive motivation, others find negative reasons to 
diversify in what becomes conglomerate mergers.  
Even though there is a vast literature on some of the variables that may affect the performance 
of a merged firm, others are still relatively unexamined. One such overlooked variable is the 
difference in capital structure between the bidder and the target firm. Smith (1986) analyses the 
impact of increases in leverage ratio on security prices, though he did not consider differences 
between the two firms prior to the merger. Heron and Lie (2002) also study the impact of 
increases in leverage ratios, but they study their relationship to methods of payment instead. 
There is a gap in the literature comprised of the failure to compare the capital structure of both 
the acquirer and target firm. 
The choice of capital structure, however, is by no means an overlooked topic in the finance 
literature. One of the first steps in this field of research was made by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), proposing the irrelevance theorem. This proposition denotes that financial leverage does 
not impact a firm’s value, i.e., the way that firms finance themselves (debt vs equity) does not 
have an impact on the firm’s value. By increasing debt, because it is cheaper than equity, the 
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company will face a higher equity cost. Therefore, the benefits of raising debt will be offset by 
the upsurge in equity costs.   
Since markets are not efficient and embody several imperfections, Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
revisited their previous work to consider this time the costs (such as agency costs and financial 
distress costs) and benefits of debt (such as tax shields), leading to the creation of the static 
trade-off theory.  
The second big step in capital structures decisions theory was brought forward by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) through the pecking order theory. This theory considers adverse selection 
problems (sellers have information that the buyer does not have) and builds a hierarchy for 
minimizing costs associated with such problems. According to Myers and Majluf, firms prefer 
retained earnings, then debt, and, ultimately, equity for the purposes of funding investment 
opportunities. This theory is justified by the adverse market reaction that accompanies the 
announcement of seasoned equity issuance. Debt, on the other hand, comprises a lower 
information asymmetry and thus yields lower remuneration for investors.  
The consequences of leverage on acquisitions are an ambiguous subject among researchers. 
Harrison et al. (2014), using a sample of 2,218 acquisitions from 1972 to 2005, found that the 
amount of leverage carried out in acquisitions has a positive impact on performance. Their 
results are consistent with previous research. Jensen and Meckling (1976) found that higher 
leverage reduces agency costs because managers are restricted from pursuing investment 
opportunities that might lead to lower returns. Jensen (1986) also further considered the 
pressure on management to pursue projects with higher returns, leading to the acquisition of 
companies with more assured profit returns. On the other hand, some authors focus on the 
downsides of leverage in acquisitions. Lin and Chang (2012) study the relationship between the 
amount of leverage and financial distress costs, stating that managers feel forced to pursue 
projects with lower risk, reducing the value maximization principle that they would consider if 
they could instead pursue projects with higher risk. Testing for two different time periods 
(1978-1982 and 1983-1987), Miller and Bromiley (1990) concluded that debt is accompanied 
by a higher risk, which negatively impacts the company’s post-merger performance. 
This research has significant further importance due to leveraged buyouts (LBOs). This type of 
acquisition has given a great deal of attention in the literature, not only because of high returns 
that private equity funds experience, but also due to secure access to debt by such funds for 
pursuing all types of investments, which might impact the global economy in the future. A 
11 
 
leveraged buyout (LBO) is the acquisition of a company by another company through the use 
of high amounts of debt. Most of the time, bidder firms use target assets as collateral. Many 
authors agree that LBO occurrence creates a significant positive impact on a firm’s performance 
(Palepu, 1990; Smith, 1990; Smart and Waldfogel, 1994), though some conclude that the 
amount of leverage instead has no impact. For Palepu (1990), factors like change in the 
organizational structure are the main reason for LBO success. On the other hand, Reich (1989) 
and Long and Ravenscraft (1993) draw an opposing conclusion regarding leveraged buyouts. 
They conclude that debt payment schedules lead to firms cutting R&D expenditures, affecting 
the post-acquisition performance of the company.   
For some specialists, it is challenging to assess the post-performance of a buyout due to earnings 
manipulation by managers (Wu, 1997; Chou et al., 2006). Using a sample data of 87 
management buyouts, Wu (1997) finds that managers tend to manipulate earnings prior to the 
deal in order to present the market with a positive post-merger performance. Chou et al. (2005) 
also show that there is often manipulation of earnings before a reverse LBO (turning a company 
that was privatized by a leveraged buyout into a public company again), which positively 
impacts the stock performance after issuance.  
As such, there is a gap within the literature that evaluates the post-merger performance. There 
is already some research on the study of the impact of several variables on such performances, 
but the impact of the capital structure of both the acquiring firm and the target firm is still 
missing scrutiny. Furthermore, most of the research on M&A focus on stock returns, and rarely 
considers firm-level performance, utilized in this research as pre-tax operating cash flow over 











3. Methodology and Variable Construction  
3.1. Dependent Variable: Difference in performance before and after the merger 
The dependent variable is built by comparing pre-merger performance with post-merger 
performance. This performance measure is computed by dividing the pre-tax operating cash-
flow of a company to the market value of its assets (Healy et al., 1992). The pre-tax operating 
cash-flow is defined by sales, minus cost of goods sold, selling and administrative expenses, in 
addition to any non-cash expenses (depreciation, amortization and goodwill). The market value 
of assets is computed by adding the market value of equity to the book value of debt. This 
measure enables us to create a variable that is comparable across firms, a pre-tax operating cash 
flow over the market value of assets. Excluding the effect of interest expense/income and taxes 
further enables us to avoid a potential entry point for bias in our results. By using pre-tax 
operating cash flow instead of accounting income, we exclude post-acquisition accounting 
earnings, which may arise due to methods of payment for the merger (cash vs stock). If an 
acquisition is financed by debt, post-accounting numbers will be influenced by the amount 
raised and, consequently, result in lower performance. Therefore, since earnings mirror capital 
structure choices and not the economic performance of the company, we do not consider 
accounting earnings. Since we are studying the impact of capital structure on performance, this 
effect would be repeatedly accounted for in our model. 
The performance measure was computed for the five years preceding and following the merger. 
For the previous five periods, the performance measure is computed by summing the cash flows 
of the acquiring and targeted firms and dividing it by the sum of the market value of the assets 
of both.  Furthermore, post-merger performance is computed by dividing the cash flow of the 
acquiring firm by the market value of its assets. The median of the five years prior to the merger, 
and the five years following the merger can then be computed. This difference between both 
medians then corresponds to the dependent variable. If its value is positive, we can state that 
there was an increase in performance. However, if its value is negative, we should state that 
there was a decrease in performance. The same analysis was performed considering three- and 
one-year range before and after the merger. 
3.2. Independent Variables: Leverage Dummies 
To recap, the main objective of this analysis is to study the impact of leverage on both the 
target’s and acquiring company’s post-merger performances. Hence, in order to assess the 
difference between a highly leveraged and a lowly leveraged company, limits must be chosen. 
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Here we consider values above the median of leverage ratios of stand-alone companies as being 
highly leveraged, with values below the median of leverage ratios of stand-alone companies as 
being lowly leveraged. We are thus able to assess what kind of merger we are considering - a 
highly levered company acquiring a highly levered company, a lowly levered company 
acquiring a lowly levered company, a highly levered company acquiring a lowly levered 
company (and vice-versa). In this manner, three dummy variables were created for our 
purposes. For a clearer perception, figure 1 presents a simplified diagram with the four types of 
mergers. 
Figure 1 - Types of Mergers according to Leverage Ratios 
 
This variable construction method has some limitations that should be highlighted. Firstly, 
when considering observations above and below the median, we have undertaken the 
assumption that our sample contains both highly leveraged firms and lowly leveraged firms. 
Secondly, we consider that our sample is illustrative of M&A activity in the sample period. 
This might not occur due to the preliminary clearing from our dataset of any observations that 
did not have available accounting data for the relevant time periods. 
3.3.  Control Variables 
In order to capture the effects of other variables on post-merger performance, further measures 
were added to the model. As such, we drew on the model proposed by Harrison (2014). 
Therefore, we used the following variables, all of which concern the year immediately 
preceding the merger: 
Industry Variable: in order to capture industry-specific effects on the post-merger performance 
we considered whether both acquirer and target belonged to the same industry, through the 
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creation of a dummy variable. This variable is assigned a value of 1 whenever both companies 
belonged to the same industry (most often in horizontal mergers), and a value of 0 otherwise 
(often the case in conglomerate mergers).  
Cash and short-term investments: our variable, in this case, consists of cash and short 
investments, scaled by total assets. This measure is considered for both the targeted and 
acquiring firms. 
Acquirer Market-to-Book (M/B): this variable consists of the total book value of common 
equity, divided by market capitalization. This measure is usually used as a proxy for a 
company’s future growth prospects (Fama and French, 1995; Penman, 1996; Frank and Goyal, 
2009).   
Acquirer Sales Growth: this variable is constructed by calculating the difference between 
current yearly sales with previous yearly sales, dividing by prior year sales. This variable is 
usually used to gauge a firm’s growth at the operational level. (Gupta, 1969; Garlappi et al., 
2008; Harrison, 2014) 
Relative target size: computed by dividing the market capitalization of the target firm by the 
acquiring firm’s market capitalization. This variable allows us to account for the effect of the 
target on the merged firm’s performance. (Harrison, 2014) 
Acquirer Net Operating Assets: this measure follows on the footsteps of work done by Nissin 
and Penman (2001). Our variable is constructed by the sum of net financial obligations with 
common equity, in addition to minority interests. Firstly, net financial obligations are defined 
as the difference between financial obligations and financial assets. Financial obligations are 
expressed as debt in current liabilities, along with total long-term debt, with preferred stock 
added, subtracting preferred stock in treasury, and further adding preferred dividends in arrears. 
Financial assets are composed of the sum of cash and short-term investments along with other 
investments in advances. Secondly, common equity is calculated by summing common equity 
and preferred stock in treasury, and subtracting preferred dividends in arrears. Finally, minority 
interests are retrieved from the financial statements of our firms. This variable is scaled by 
lagged total assets1. 
Acquirer Accruals: this variable is constructed along the lines of Richardson et al.’s (2005) 
work. It is computed by summing the change in working capital, in non-current operating 
 
1 Variable is scaled by lagged total assets for the purpose of avoiding problems that might arise for 
operating assets, and total assets were similarly determined. 
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accruals, and in financial assets. This summed change corresponds to the variation from the 
prior year to the current year. Firstly, working capital is calculated by subtracting current 
operating liabilities from current operating assets. Current operating assets, in turn, is 
constructed by subtracting the difference between current assets and cash and short-term 
investments, while current operating liabilities are defined as current liabilities minus debt in 
current liabilities. Secondly, variation in non-current operating accruals is calculated by 
subtracting the difference between non-current operating assets and non-current operating 
liabilities. Non-current liabilities are themselves calculated as total assets minus current assets, 
while also subtracting other investments in advances. Non-current liabilities are totalled by 
subtracting current liabilities and long-term debt from total liabilities. Finally, change in 
financial assets is itself the difference between financial assets and financial liabilities. While 
financial assets are defined as the sum of short-term investments and other investments in 
advances, financial liabilities are instead calculated as total liabilities, plus debt in current 
liabilities, plus preferred stock. As Acquirer Net Operating Assets, this variable is scaled by 
lagged total assets. 
Acquirer Altman Z-Score: this variable corresponds to the Altman z-score formula: Z-Score = 
1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E, where A = working capital / total assets, B = retained 
earnings / total assets, C = earnings before interest and tax / total assets, D = market value of 
equity / total liabilities and E = sales / total assets. This discriminant-ratio model, created by 
Altman (1968), allows us to predict corporate bankruptcy using accounting ratios. The higher 
the z-score, the lower the company’s probability of bankruptcy. When the score is higher than 
3.0, bankruptcy is unlikely. If the score is below 1.8 however, there is a high likelihood of the 
company becoming bankrupt shortly. This variable is further explained with more detail in 
Section 5. 
As such, the following regression will be estimated: 
∆𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 = (𝐻 − 𝐻 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖 + (𝐿 − 𝐿 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖 + (𝐻 − 𝐿 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑖 + 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖
+ 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖 + 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑖
+ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖






4. Data and Summary Statistics 
Our research considers all completed mergers between 1990 and 2013 in which accounting data 
was available in Compustat North America for the previous and subsequent five years of the 
effective date of the merger. Furthermore, it only considers mergers between US public 
companies during the relevant time period, a requirement in order to have available data through 
Compustat. Moreover, our sample does not consider financial and utility companies, since they 
are subject to special accounting and regulatory requirements (Healy et al., 1992; Fama and 
French, 2002; Uysal, 2011). Therefore, using the Deal Screener by Thomson Reuters Eikon, 
we were able to retrieve our dataset sample, comprising 594 mergers between a total of 1188 
firms.  
Table 1 - Sample distribution by Years 
Table 1 presents the distribution of transactions by years. Columns (1) and (4) represent the 
year of the merger. Columns (2) and (5) correspond to the absolute number of deals considered 
in the sample. Concerning columns (3) and (6), they represent the relative fraction of mergers 
in the sample. It is computed by dividing the absolute value by the total number of observations.  
The sample comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. 
 
Table 1 seen above explores the distribution of deals on a yearly basis. A visual analysis of the 
data allows us to develop some preliminary conclusions. Firstly, most of the deals in the sample 
take place between 1999 and 2010. Secondly, there is an increasing trend of deals between 1990 




Fraction of Sample 
(3) 




Fraction of Sample 
(6) 
1990 5 0,020 2002 31 0,127 
1991 8 0,033 2003 38 0,156 
1992 4 0,016 2004 36 0,148 
1993 2 0,008 2005 47 0,193 
1994 5 0,020 2006 40 0,164 
1995 7 0,029 2007 53 0,217 
1996 10 0,041 2008 30 0,123 
1997 13 0,053 2009 25 0,102 
1998 20 0,082 2010 39 0,160 
1999 34 0,139 2011 4 0,016 
2000 70 0,287 2012 6 0,025 
2001 66 0,270 2013 1 0,004 
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and 2001, reaching its highest value in 2000, with 71 deals. Finally, at the beginning of the 
century, there is a marked deceleration in M&A activity, with the number of transactions 
consistently falling below a yearly total of 50. In fact, only 2007, the year prior to the financial 
crisis, saw a number of transactions higher than 50.  
Our conclusions here have some limitations that must be highlighted. Firstly, the lack of deals 
in the first years of our sample can be explained by Compustat’s lack of information on 
individual companies’ fundamentals. Secondly, in the most recent years (between 2011 and 
2013), the low amount of observations in the sample is explained by missing information about 
companies accounting data in pre or post-merger years. All in all, 744 observations were lost 
due to the lack of accounting data for the prior and posterior five years in both the acquirer and 
target company.  
Table 2 - Sample Distribution by Industry 
Table 2 presents the distribution of companies involved in transactions by industry. Panel A 
comprises data of the acquirer firm, while Panel B presents data of the target. In column (1) are 
represented the SIC industries. Columns (2) and (4) represent the number of companies in each 
industry for acquirer and target, respectively. Concerning columns (3) and (5), they represent 
the relative fraction of firms in the sample. It is computed by dividing the absolute value by the 
total number of observations in acquirer and target, respectively. The sample comprises 594 
transactions between 1990 and 2013. 
 
Table 2 allows us to visually inspect the distribution of companies by industry. Relative to all 
the companies in the sample (acquirers and targets), most firms belong to the Manufacturing 









Fraction of Sample 
(5) 
Mining 27 0.045 22 0.037 
Construction 7 0.012 1 0.002 
Manufacturing 352 0.593 323 0.544 
Transportation & Public Utilities 87 0.146 64 0.108 
Wholesale Trade 26 0.044 24 0.040 
Retail Trade 13 0.022 27 0.045 
Services 78 0.131 124 0.209 
Public Administration 4 0.007 9 0.015 
Total 594 1 594 1 
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industry (approximately 59.3% in acquirers and 54.4% in targets). Therefore, our research 
results may be particularly relevant for the Manufacturing industry, in contrast with transactions 
involving the Construction and Public Administration industry, which represent a marginal part 
of the total sample. The second industry with the highest share in our sample is Transportation 
& Public Utilities, and Services, for acquiring and target firms, respectively.  
In order to describe the variables used in our model, Table 3 presents the summary statistics of 
our sample. In terms of our performance variation variable, we observe a variation between -
0.415 and 0.933, effectively suggesting that there are companies within our sample where 
performance decreased by approximately 41.5 percentage points from the prior to the 
subsequent five years relative to the merger, while in others the performance measure increased 
by approximately 93.3 percentage points.  
Table 3 - Summary Statistics 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The variables, 
represented on column (1), are described through mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6), respectively. The number of observations is 
embodied in column (2). The sample comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. 
 
Before presenting model estimates, we can further explore Appendix 1 to determine the 













Performance Variation 594 0.087 0.153 -0.415 0.933 
H_H Dummy 594 0.286 0.452 0 1 
L_L Dummy 594 0.286 0.452 0 1 
H_L Dummy 594 0.214 0.410 0 1 
Same Industry Dummy 594 0.283 0.451 0 1 
Acquirer Cash 594 0.158 0.176 0 0.960 
Target Cash 594 0.221 0.230 0 0.990 
Acquirer Book to Market 594 0.456 0.394 -1.363 4.289 
Acquirer Sales Growth 594 0.256 1.010 -0.684 16.357 
Relative Target Size 594 9.749 57.800 0 831.733 
Acquirer NOA 594 0.914 1.539 -1.005 18.105 
Acquirer Accruals 594 0.158 0.728 -1.258 15.881 
Acquirer Altman Z-Score 594 0.933 0.729 0 5.602 
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variables and independent variables range between -0.106 and 0.119. However, the variables 
that embody the motivation behind the study (H_H, L_L and H_L) range between -0.059 and 
0.045. If we analyse them individually, we can determine that a highly leveraged acquiring 
firm, buying a highly leveraged target firm, is associated with a negative performance ex-post.  
This result contrasts with a lowly levered company buying a lowly levered company and a 
highly levered company buying a lowly levered company. However, the latter is very close to 
zero, which leads us to expect that the coefficient should not be statistically significant should 
we run a regression analysis.  
In order to better understand the distribution of performance measures, Table 4 (panel A) 
presents median pre-tax operating cash flow returns for merged firms between year -5 and -1. 
Panel B of table 4 reports the same measures for year 1 to 5. The medians of performance in 
years -5 to -1 range from 0.162 and 0.193 in our pre-merger years. In the post-merger context, 
medians varied between 0.251 and 0.267. When the median of annual performance for years    
-5 to -1 and 1 to 5 is calculated, the result is 0.177 and 0.261 respectively. Therefore, by 
subtracting post-merger performance from the pre-merger performance, we can see that on 
average, performance is higher. This challenges Healy et al.’s (1992) results, where they found 
that performance on average decreases. They justify their results by the absence of the impact 
of changes in equity due to overall market movements that may impact measurements over 
time. Furthermore, the authors relied solely on the 50 largest mergers between 1979 and 1983. 
This is a relatively low sample of observations and may be affected by external circumstances 












Table 4 - Annual firm median operating pre-tax cash flow return on assets in the years 
surrounding the merger 
Table 4 embodies the performance measures of firms in each year. The performance measure 
follows the definition of Healy et al. (1992). This performance measure is computed by dividing 
the pre-tax operating cash-flow of a company to the market value of its assets. The pre-tax 
operating cash-flow is defined by sales, minus cost of goods sold, selling and administrative 
expenses, in addition to any non-cash expenses (depreciation, amortization and goodwill). The 
market value of assets is computed by adding the market value of equity to the book value of 
debt. Pre- and pro-merger performance measures are respectively represented in panel A and 
panel B. In each panel, the median of performance for each year is represented. Posteriorly, the 
median of those five years is retrieved. Panel C represents the Median annual difference 
between performance in years -5 to -1 and 1 to 5. The sample comprises 594 transactions 








Panel A: Pre-merger performance Panel B: Post-merger performance 








-5 0,162 1 0,251 
-4 0,165 2 0,261 
-3 0,177 3 0,262 
-2 0,189 4 0,267 
-1 0,193 5 0,261 
Median annual performance for 
years   - 5 to -1 0,177 
Median annual performance for 
years 1 to 5 0,261 
Panel C: Difference between pre- and post-merger performance 
Median annual difference between 





5. Results and Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Analysis of Capital Structure as Predictor of Post-Merger Performance 
Following the explanation embodied in Section 3, Table 5 (Panel A) presents the estimation 
output of the OLS regression. The sample here relies on the difference between the medians of 
the five pre- and post-merger years as a dependent variable. We have also experimented with 
different time frames, reducing the margin to three years for Panel B, and down to one year for 
Panel C. The OLS estimators for control variables are presented in Appendix 2.  
Table 5 - OLS Regressions where dependent variable corresponds to the variation 
between performance after and before the merger (absolute variation) 
Table 5 represents the coefficients of the explanatory variables (without control variables) when 
the absolute variation of performance is considered. Panel A considers performance for a range 
of five years. Panel B represents coefficients for a range of three years. Panel C only reflects 
performance one year before and after the merger. H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L 
Dummy represent the explanatory variables. The sample comprises 594 transactions between 
1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are represented in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Drawing from the regression presented in Panel A, one could conclude that none of the 
explanatory variables’ coefficients is statistically significant. A subsequent analysis of panel B 
and C, however, reveals some significance. Variable coefficients that are defined by a highly 
Variables Panel A: Five Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.076*** 0.009*** 0.067*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) 
H_H Dummy -0.023 -0.043** -0.027* 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) 
L_L Dummy -0.012 -0.020 -0.025 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
H_L Dummy -0.012 -0.038* -0.048*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) 
    
Observations 594 594 594 




levered company acquiring a highly levered company (H_H Dummy) and a highly levered 
company acquiring a lowly levered firm (H_L Dummy) are negative and statistically significant 
at the 5% and 10% significance levels in panel B. These are also negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% and 1% significance levels in panel C.  
When we consider a range of five years for assessing the performance of a merger, our original 
time period is too extensive to demonstrate the impact of differences in leverage on such 
mergers. There are several other effects in the five pre- and post-merger years that might affect 
performance, such as management quality and the macroeconomic context during those years. 
These could dilute the effect of leverage in a firm’s performance. Such effects can explain why, 
when the time period is reduced to three and one years in our analysis, there is a clear correlation 
between leverage and post-merger performance. 
When considering our three-year regression analysis (Panel B), our results suggest that in the 
case of both a highly levered firm acquiring a highly levered company, and a highly levered 
firm acquiring a lowly levered firm, a negative impact on performance should be expected. 
These results support Miller and Bromiley’s (1990) findings, who conclude that debt is 
accompanied by a higher risk which negatively impacts a company’s post-merger performance. 
Overall, one can see that, on average, carrying relative high levels of debt in the acquisition 
negatively impacts post-merger performance.  
An analysis of panel C appears to confirm our panel B results. The performance of one pre- and 
post-merger year suggest once more that a highly levered firm acquiring a highly levered 
company, and a highly levered firm acquiring a lowly levered firm, are associated with a 
negative impact on performance. The specific coefficient results we get from panel B and C are 
significant at different significance levels, but they nevertheless support the same conclusion – 
when acquirers have highly levered capital structures, these results, on average, in a negative 
impact on performance.  
Another way to assess the impact of leverage in performance within our model is to utilize 
performance variation as a dummy variable. This is in contrast to our previous use of the 
difference between performance ratios before and after the merger as a dependent variable. The 
performance measure corresponding to the years after the merger was built through the sum of 
pre-tax operating cash flows of the acquiring and target firm, divided by the sum of the market 
value of the assets of both firms. Furthermore, the performance measure representing the years 
immediately following the merger was calculated as the ratio between pre-tax operating cash 
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flow and the market value of the assets of the acquiring firm. The difference of both ratios 
corresponded to the performance variation in percentage points. If this difference was a positive 
value, it was considered in our analysis as a performance improvement. In cases where this 
value was negative instead, it could be concluded that there was a deterioration in overall 
performance.   
In table 6, the dependent variable is measured as a dummy variable. This variable took a value 
of 1 when there was an increase in performance (variation higher than 0) and a value of 0 where 
there was a negative variation (variation lower than 0), and consequently, a decrease in 
performance. Panel A follows the methodology described in Section 3, in which performance 
is built by taking a five-year timeframe into consideration, while Panels B and C are constructed 
on three- and one-year performance timeframes, respectively. The OLS estimators for control 
variables are represented in Appendix 3. 
Table 6 - OLS Regressions where dependent variable corresponds to variation between 
performance after and before the merger (dummy variable) 
Table 6 represents the coefficients of the explanatory variables (without control variables) when 
the variation of performance is considered. The dependent variable takes a dummy variable. 
Panel A considers performance for a range of five years. Panel B represents coefficients for a 
range of three years. Panel C only reflects performance one year before and after the merger. 
H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy represent the explanatory variables. The sample 
comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are represented in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables Panel A: Five Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.768*** 0.756*** 0.734*** 
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.062) 
 H_H Dummy 0.085* -0.117** -0.134** 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.054) 
 L_L Dummy -0.047 0.002 -0.106* 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) 
 H_L Dummy -0.037 -0.089 -0.157*** 
 (0.059) (0.064) (0.059) 
    
Observations 594 594 594 




By analyzing the results of table 6 (Panel A), where we consider performance over a five-year 
period, it becomes evident that the H_H Dummy coefficient is statistically significant at the 
10% significance level. The coefficient value itself is positive, which implies that a highly 
leveraged firm acquiring a highly leveraged company is, on average, associated with a positive 
impact on the merged firm’s performance. Several reasons can be put forward to explain this 
outcome. Firstly, companies with higher performance levels and, therefore, lower risk, may 
have higher debt capacity to pursue positive net present value projects. (Lewellen, 1971; Levy 
and Sarnat, 1970) Thus, when firms are able to raise debt to finance inorganic growth, this 
activity is likely to result in an improvement in overall performance. Secondly, these results 
support Servaes’s (1991) outcomes theory, in which he concludes that a high proportion of debt 
in an acquiring firm’s capital structure limits the management ability of misuse of cash flows, 
pursuing only projects with positive net present value. Finally, and according to Jensen’s free 
cash flow theory (1986), an overarching increasing cost of debt after debt raised for acquisition 
purposes creates added pressure on managers to be as efficient as possible.  
The results we obtained in panel B and panel C, challenge the outcome of panel A’s five-year 
margin analysis. A straightforward reduction in the timeframe to three and one years leads to a 
considerable change in the value of our coefficients. In panels B and C, the H_H Dummy 
variable coefficient is negative at the 5% significance level. One of the possible reasons for this 
occurrence is that the impact of positive leverage in performance can only be accurately 
assessed in the long run, rather than in the short run. When the three- and one-year spans are 
considered, one can only observe the negative impact of debt in performance. When the time 
span under analysis is increased, the benefits of debt can be detected. In panel C, one can also 
see that the L_L Dummy variable coefficient is positive, which implies that in most cases, a 
lowly leveraged firm acquiring a lowly leveraged company is related to a decrease in 
performance. One of the more evident reasons for this result is the acquirer’s lack of ability to 
raise debt, due to the project’s high risk. Therefore, acquirers cannot achieve an improvement 
in operating performance through the acquisition. The H_L Dummy variable’s coefficient, on 
the other hand, is negative at the 1% significance level. This result directly supports the findings 
of Miller and Bromiley (1990), who conclude that debt implies higher risk, which in turn 
negatively impacts the company’s post-merger performance. 
5.2. Expansion vs Recession Years Analysis 
For further analysis, we increased the scope of our model to include expansion and recession 
years. This increase was motivated by the importance of the macroeconomic context on the 
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success of mergers and acquisitions, and therefore crucial to modelling a firm’s overall 
performance. For this purpose, we used the US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions 
data provided by The National Bureau of Economic Research and studied by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Their data is composed of dummy variables which embody periods 
of expansion and recession. According to their study, within our sample period, 1990, 2001, 
2008 constituted periods of recession, while the remaining years were considered periods of 
expansion. The following regressions follow the methodology explained in section 3, where the 
absolute variation between pre- and post-merger years is considered.  
Table 7- OLS Regressions for Recession Years (1990, 2001 and 2008) 
Table 7 represents the regression outputs when recession years are considered, excluding 
control variables coefficients. We used the US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions 
data provided by The National Bureau of Economic Research and studied by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Panel A considers performance for a range of five years. Panel B 
represents coefficients for a range of three years. Panel C only reflects performance one year 
before and after the merger. H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy represent the 
explanatory variables. The sample comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. Robust 
standard errors are represented in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 7 provides us with the OLS coefficients for H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy 
variables. The OLS estimators for control variables are further provided in Appendix 4. While 
Variables Panel A: Five Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.040 0.124** 0.045 
 (0.036) (0.059) (0.036) 
 H_H Dummy 0.061 0.029 0.053 
 (0.038) (0.060) (0.039) 
 L_L Dummy -0.006 0.008 0.003 
 (0.039) (0.058) (0.041) 
 H_L Dummy -0.029 0.013 -0.031 
 (0.050) (0.073) (0.048) 
    
Observations 101 101 101 
R-squared 0.222 0.283 0.176 
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panel A follows the difference in the performance medians of the five pre- and post-merger 
years, panel B and panel C, consider three and one years, respectively. By analyzing our table 
7 results, we find that none of the explanatory variables has significant coefficients for our three 
scenarios. A possible interpretation is that the low number of observations under analysis are 
insufficient to produce statistically significant results. When expansion periods are considered 
however, as evidenced by table 8 below, the H_L Dummy variable coefficient within our three-
year analysis is statistically significant at the 10% significant level. The negative coefficient 
implies that, on average, a highly leveraged company acquiring a lowly levered firm, is 
associated with a negative impact on performance. These results offer support to our analysis 
in section 5.1, which is itself supportive of Miller and Bromiley (1990)’s work, on the 
relationship between leverage and risk and its negative impact on performance. The OLS 


















Table 8 - OLS Regressions for Expansion Years 
Table 8 represents the regression outputs when expansion years are considered, excluding 
control variables. We used the US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions data provided 
by The National Bureau of Economic Research and studied by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. Panel A considers performance for a range of five years. Panel B represents coefficients 
for a range of three years. Panel C only reflects performance one year before and after the 
merger. H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy represent the explanatory variables. The 
sample comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are 
represented in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
5.3. Risk Categories Analysis 
Edward Altman (1968) created a Z-score measure to predict the chance of a given company 
going bankrupt. This method of assessing bankruptcy probability of a company is inherently 
reliant on historical data. This data is extracted from companies’ financial statements. There are 
two extensions of this model, which can be dubbed as z’-score and z’’-score. This measure is, 
however, only applicable to privately held companies. Overall, this calculation of credit risk 
takes five ratios into account: profitability, leverage, liquidity, solvency and activity. The 
following formula provides an illustration of the Z-Score:  















  , 
Variables Panel A: Five Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.052*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) 
 H_H Dummy -0.016 -0.028 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
 L_L Dummy -0.008 -0.010 -0.027 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
 H_L Dummy 0.009 -0.046* -0.037 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) 
    
Observations 493 493 493 




where MV and BV correspond to market value and book value, respectively. The higher the 
score, the lower the probability of default. When the score is higher than 3.0, default is 
considered unlikely. A score between 2.7 and 3 suggests that the company should be on alert. 
Any score between 1.8 and 2.7 indicates that there is a moderate probability of default. Finally, 
when the score is found to be below 1.8, it is very likely that the company will be heading to 
bankruptcy.   
In our analysis, we considered two types of firms: firms with a z-score above the sample’s 
median, and firms with a z-score lower below the median of the sample. In this particular case, 
the benchmarked median was 0.703, implying that over half the sample was headed towards 
bankruptcy. This situation is similar to the agency cost problems studied by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), where the managerial pursuit of risky projects resulted in conflicts with 
shareholders. Table 9 presents the regression coefficients for our five-, three- and one-year 
timeframes. The OLS estimators for control variables are presented in Appendix 6. By 
analyzing our results, as shown in table 9, we find that none of the explanatory variables has 

















Table 9- OLS Regressions for Altman Z-score above the median of sample 
Table 15 represents the regression outputs considering only companies within the sample that 
have Altman Z-score higher than the median of the sample. Panel A considers performance for 
a range of five years. Panel B represents coefficients for a range of three years. Panel C only 
reflects performance one year before and after the merger. H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and 
H_L Dummy represent the explanatory variables. The sample comprises 594 transactions 
between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are represented in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
By analyzing the results on table 9, for five years and one-year performance assessment H_H 
dummy variable coefficient is statistically significant at 10% significance level. Therefore, it 
can be seen that, on average, when a highly leveraged company acquires a highly leveraged 
firm, is related to a negative impact on the merged firm’s performance. Once again, these results 
prove the relationship between leverage and risk, creating a negative impact on performance. 
In table 9, the OLS coefficients are represented. The OLS estimators for control variables are 







Variables Panel A: Five Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.056** 0.072** 0.082*** 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.024) 
 H_H Dummy -0.014* -0.025 -0.034* 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
 L_L Dummy -0.003 0.014 -0.025 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.027) 
 H_L Dummy 0.012 -0.014 -0.033 
 -0.014 -0.025 -0.034 
    
Observations 297 297 297 




Table 10 - OLS Regressions for Altman Z-score below the median of sample 
Table 16 represents the regression outputs considering only companies within the sample that 
have Altman Z-score lower than the median of the sample. Panel A considers performance for 
a range of five years. Panel B represents coefficients for a range of three years. Panel C only 
reflects performance one year before and after the merger. H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and 
H_L Dummy represent the explanatory variables. The sample comprises 594 transactions 
between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are represented in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
The OLS estimators presented in Table 10 (Panel B), support previous results that studies on 
the relationship between leverage and risk and their impact on post-merger performance (Miller 
and Bromiley, 1990). It appears clear that, on average, when highly levered firms with relatively 
lower Altman Z-Score pursue acquisition opportunities, this pursuit is associated with a 
negative impact on performance. When relying on a range of five years to assess the 
performance of a merger, the time period appears to be too extensive for our analysis to properly 






Variables Panel A: Five Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.098** 0.157*** 0.086* 
 (0.047) (0.058) (0.045) 
 H_H Dummy -0.026 -0.056* -0.018 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.027) 
 L_L Dummy -0.018 -0.018 -0.021 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
 H_L Dummy -0.028 -0.062** -0.062** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) 
    
Observations 
297 297 297 




6. Conclusion and Future Research  
Our innovative model studied the impact of leverage on a firm’s post-merger performance. 
Following the performance measure suggested by Healy et al. (1992), the five years before and 
after the merger were analysed. For a sample of 594 mergers between 1990 and 2013, we found 
that a highly leveraged firm acquiring either a highly leveraged company or a lowly leveraged 
firm had a negative and significant impact on the post-merger performance of the majority of 
our cases. This effect is verified when the timeframe is changed to the three and one pre- and 
post-merger years. When broadening our analysis to the five-year timeframe however, the 
statistical significance disappears. We posit that this likely occurs due to the dilution of the 
leverage effect when analysing performance over a more extended timeframe. 
When the same methodology was applied to years when there was an economic expansion at 
the macroeconomic level, we found that a highly leveraged firm acquiring a lowly leveraged 
firm was associated with a negative impact on post-merger performance. For recession years, 
we found no such relationship between leverage and post-merger performance. 
Finally, we applied our model to different risk categories. For this purpose, we divided our 
sample into two parts: the first considered transaction acquirers with Altman Z-scores above 
the median, while the second considered transaction acquirers that had Altman Z-scores below 
the median. In cases where the Altman Z-Score was lower than the median of the sample, we 
found that on average, when highly leveraged companies acquire another highly leveraged firm, 
was correlated to a negative impact on performance. The former occurs for three-year 
performance analysis. Finally, when a one-year margin was analysed, we found that highly 
leveraged firms acquiring lowly leveraged companies typically led to a deterioration in 
performance. Similar results were found to Altman Z-Score higher than the median of the 
sample, in which highly leveraged companies acquiring a highly leveraged firm, was associated 
with a negative impact on performance. 
Overall, our results show that when acquiring firms are highly levered, this will typically lead 
to a negative impact on post-merger performance. The limiting of our study to the five years 
before and after the merger prevents us from providing any additional results or analyses on 
possible longer-term effects on firm’s post-merge performances. Increasing the timeframe for 
analysis within our study would, unfortunately, simultaneously and significantly reduce our 
sample size, thereby diminishing the quality of our analysis. Thus, retrieving further data for 
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all companies involved in M&A in order to obtain a higher amount of observations and expand 
our horizon understudy would be a valuable avenue for additional and future research.  
Furthermore, the importance of our study is very much interconnected with LBOs. Private 
equity firms rely on this financing scheme for the purposes of acquiring private firms. In our 
work here, we studied only the impact of leverage on public firms from the US. One could 
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 Appendix 1 represents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the analysis. The sample comprises 594 transactions.
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13) 
 (1)  Performance Variation 1.000 
 (2) H_H Dummy -0.062 1.000 
 (3) L_L Dummy 0.023 -0.401 1.000 
 (4) H_L Dummy  0.057 -0.330 -0.330 1.000 
 (5)  Same Industry Dummy 0.083 -0.009 0.140 -0.072 1.000 
 (6) Acquirer Cash -0.027 -0.290 0.305 -0.209 0.109 1.000 
 (7) Target Cash 0.120 -0.391 0.423 0.180 0.151 0.223 1.000 
 (8)  Acquirer Book to Market 0.085 0.137 -0.184 0.156 -0.062 -0.129 -0.082 1.000 
 (9)  Acquirer Sales Growth -0.110 0.059 -0.033 -0.066 -0.032 0.147 -0.028 -0.102 1.000 
 (10)  Relative Target Size  0.012 0.022 -0.065 0.079 -0.094 0.017 -0.073 0.146 0.013 1.000 
 (11) Acquirer NOA 0.091 0.073 -0.073 -0.019 0.012 -0.061 -0.111 0.002 0.125 0.003 1.000 
 (12)  Acquirer Accruals 0.038 -0.005 0.061 -0.077 0.122 0.114 -0.031 -0.114 0.154 0.017 0.027 1.000 




OLS Regressions where dependent variable corresponds to the variation between 
performance after and before the merger (absolute variation) 
Appendix 2 represents the regression outputs when absolute variation of performance is considered. Panel A 
considers performance for a range of five years. Panel B represents coefficients for a range of three years. Panel 
C only reflects performance one year before and after the merger. H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy 
represent the explanatory variables. Same Industry Dummy, Acquirer Cash, Target Cash, Acquirer Book to 
Market, Acquirer Sales Growth, Relative Target Size, Acquirer NOA, Acquirer Accruals and Acquirer Altman Z-
Score are control variables and follow the definition embodied in section 3. The sample comprises 594 transactions 
between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are represented in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A: Five 
Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.076*** 0.009*** 0.067*** 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.019) 
H_H Dummy -0.023 -0.043** -0.027* 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) 
L_L Dummy -0.012 -0.020 -0.025 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) 
H_L Dummy -0.012 -0.038* -0.048*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) 
Same Industry Dummy 0.019 0.027* 0.019 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) 
Acquirer Cash -0.054 -0.048 -0.003 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.043) 
Target Cash 0.087*** 0.036 0.090*** 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.034) 
Acquirer Book to Market 0.036* -0.043** 0.021 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) 
Acquirer Sales Growth -0.018*** 0.003 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.014) 
Relative Target Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquirer NOA 0.011*** 0.006 0.005* 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Acquirer Accruals 0.012** 0.015 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) 
Acquirer Altman Z-Score -0.018** -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
    
Observations 594 594 594 





OLS Regressions where dependent variable corresponds to variation between 
performance after and before the merger (dummy variable) 
Appendix 3 represents the regression outputs when variation of performance is considered. The dependent variable 
takes a dummy variable. Panel A considers performance for a range of five years. Panel B represents coefficients 
for a range of three years. Panel C only reflects performance one year before and after the merger. H_H Dummy, 
L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy represent the explanatory variables. Same Industry Dummy, Acquirer Cash, Target 
Cash, Acquirer Book to Market, Acquirer Sales Growth, Relative Target Size, Acquirer NOA, Acquirer Accruals 
and Acquirer Altman Z-Score are control variables and follow the definition embodied in section 3. The sample 
comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are represented in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A: Five 
Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.768*** 0.756*** 0.734*** 
 (0.057) (0.064) (0.062) 
H_H Dummy 0.085* -0.117** -0.134** 
 (0.055) (0.057) (0.054) 
L_L Dummy -0.047 0.002 -0.106* 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) 
H_L Dummy -0.037 -0.089 -0.157*** 
 (0.059) (0.064) (0.059) 
Same Industry Dummy 0.031 0.073* 0.090** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) 
Acquirer Cash -0.161 -0.140 -0.169 
 (0.109) (0.118) (0.123) 
Target Cash 0.280*** 0.107 0.323*** 
 (0.086) (0.095) (0.090) 
Acquirer Book to Market -0.043 -0.116** -0.001 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.053) 
Acquirer Sales Growth -0.039*** -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.021) (0.021) 
Relative Target Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquirer NOA 0.027*** 0.010 0.016 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Acquirer Accruals 0.036*** 0.037* 0.028** 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.011) 
Acquirer Altman Z-Score -0.021 -0.008 0.008 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
    
Observations 594 594 594 





OLS Regressions for Recession Years (1990, 2001 and 2008) 
Appendix 4 represents the regression outputs when recession years are considered. We used the US Business Cycle 
Expansions and Contractions data provided by The National Bureau of Economic Research and studied by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Panel A considers performance for a range of five years. Panel B represents 
coefficients for a range of three years. Panel C only reflects performance one year before and after the merger.  
H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy represent the explanatory variables. Same Industry Dummy, 
Acquirer Cash, Target Cash, Acquirer Book to Market, Acquirer Sales Growth, Relative Target Size, Acquirer 
NOA, Acquirer Accruals and Acquirer Altman Z-Score are control variables and follow the definition embodied 
in section 3. The sample comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are 
represented in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A: Five 
Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.040 0.124** 0.045 
 (0.036) (0.059) (0.036) 
H_H Dummy 0.061 0.029 0.053 
 (0.038) (0.060) (0.039) 
L_L Dummy -0.006 0.008 0.003 
 (0.039) (0.058) (0.041) 
H_L Dummy -0.029 0.013 -0.031 
 (0.050) (0.073) (0.048) 
Same Industry Dummy 0.033 0.038 0.023 
 (0.036) (0.043) (0.034) 
Acquirer Cash -0.043 -0.116 -0.047 
 (0.057) (0.096) (0.061) 
Target Cash 0.085 0.013 0.106 
 (0.064) (0.089) (0.065) 
Acquirer Book to Market 0.100** -0.103** 0.061* 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.034) 
Acquirer Sales Growth 0.029 -0.074 -0.026 
 (0.051) (0.086) (0.055) 
Relative Target Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquirer NOA 0.003 0.023** 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
Acquirer Accruals 0.101 0.172 0.102 
 (0.085) (0.115) (0.070) 
Acquirer Altman Z-Score -0.037 -0.032 -0.034 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
    
Observations 101 101 101 





OLS Regressions for Expansion Years 
Appendix 5 represents the regression outputs when expansion years are considered. We used the US Business 
Cycle Expansions and Contractions data provided by The National Bureau of Economic Research and studied by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Panel A considers performance for a range of five years. Panel B represents 
coefficients for a range of three years. Panel C only reflects performance one year before and after the merger.  
H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy represent the explanatory variables. Same Industry Dummy, 
Acquirer Cash, Target Cash, Acquirer Book to Market, Acquirer Sales Growth, Relative Target Size, Acquirer 
NOA, Acquirer Accruals and Acquirer Altman Z-Score are control variables and follow the definition embodied 
in section 3. The sample comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are 
represented in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A: Five 
Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.052*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) 
H_H Dummy -0.016 -0.028 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
L_L Dummy -0.008 -0.010 -0.027 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
H_L Dummy 0.009 -0.046* -0.037 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) 
Same Industry Dummy 0.012 0.016 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Acquirer Cash -0.030 -0.032 0.039 
 (0.051) (0.055) (0.051) 
Target Cash 0.099** 0.042 0.098** 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) 
Acquirer Book to Market 0.012 -0.014 0.004 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) 
Acquirer Sales Growth -0.019*** 0.007 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.016) (0.014) 
Relative Target Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquirer NOA 0.014*** -0.003 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Acquirer Accruals 0.012** 0.014 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) 
Acquirer Altman Z-Score -0.014* -0.007 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
    
Observations 493 493 493 





OLS Regressions OLS Regressions for Companies with Altman Z-score higher than the 
median of the sample 
Appendix 6 represents the regression outputs considering only companies within the sample that have Altman Z-
score higher than the median of the sample. Panel A considers performance for a range of five years. Panel B 
represents coefficients for a range of three years. Panel C only reflects performance one year before and after the 
merger. H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy represent the explanatory variables. Same Industry Dummy, 
Acquirer Cash, Target Cash, Acquirer Book to Market, Acquirer Sales Growth, Relative Target Size, Acquirer 
NOA, Acquirer Accruals and Acquirer Altman Z-Score are control variables and follow the definition embodied 
in section 3. The sample comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are 
represented in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A: Five 
Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.056** 0.072** 0.082*** 
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.024) 
H_H Dummy -0.014* -0.025 -0.034* 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) 
L_L Dummy -0.003 0.014 -0.025 
 (0.021) (0.030) (0.027) 
H_L Dummy 0.012 -0.014 -0.033 
 -0.014 -0.025 -0.034 
Same Industry Dummy -0.049 0.032 -0.009 
 (0.057) (0.043) (0.064) 
Acquirer Cash -0.025 -0.350 -0.162 
 (0.170) (0.229) (0.194) 
Target Cash 0.075 0.074 0.075 
 (0.091) (0.118) (0.063) 
Acquirer Book to Market -0.007 -0.065 -0.045 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) 
Acquirer Sales Growth -0.247* -0.094 -0.239 
 (0.144) (0.106) (0.151) 
Relative Target Size 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquirer NOA 0.002 -0.037 -0.013 
 (0.037) (0.046) (0.043) 
Acquirer Accruals 0.300 0.229* 0.368** 
 (0.184) (0.117) (0.167) 
Acquirer Altman Z-Score 0.019 -0.041* -0.000 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.020) 
    
Observations 297 297 297 





OLS Regressions for Companies with Altman Z-score lower than the median of the 
sample 
Table 16 represents the regression outputs considering only companies within the sample that have Altman Z-
score lower than the median of the sample. Panel A considers performance for a range of five years. Panel B 
represents coefficients for a range of three years. Panel C only reflects performance one year before and after the 
merger. H_H Dummy, L_L Dummy and H_L Dummy represent the explanatory variables. Same Industry Dummy, 
Acquirer Cash, Target Cash, Acquirer Book to Market, Acquirer Sales Growth, Relative Target Size, Acquirer 
NOA, Acquirer Accruals and Acquirer Altman Z-Score are control variables and follow the definition embodied 
in section 3. The sample comprises 594 transactions between 1990 and 2013. Robust standard errors are 
represented in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Variables 
Panel A: Five 
Years Variation 
Panel B: Three Years 
Variation 
Panel C: One Year 
Variation 
Intercept 0.098** 0.157*** 0.086* 
 (0.047) (0.058) (0.045) 
H_H Dummy -0.026 -0.056* -0.018 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.027) 
L_L Dummy -0.018 -0.018 -0.021 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
H_L Dummy -0.028 -0.062** -0.062** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) 
Same Industry Dummy 0.021 0.030* 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) 
Acquirer Cash -0.062 -0.047 -0.003 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.045) 
Target Cash 0.085** 0.041 0.098*** 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) 
Acquirer Book to Market 0.036 -0.044* 0.024 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.019) 
Acquirer Sales Growth -0.019*** 0.003 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.017) (0.014) 
Relative Target Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquirer NOA 0.012*** 0.006 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Acquirer Accruals 0.010** 0.015 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) 
Acquirer Altman Z-Score -0.056*** -0.001 -0.015 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) 
    
Observations 297 297 297 
R-squared 0.092 0.081 0.074  
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